


Statistics and Data Analysis (HEP)

The Dark Arts:

- Bayesian inference
- Credible intervals
- Systematics uncertainties



Follow the course/slides from M. A. Thomson lectures at Cambridge University

Lecture 1: The basics

Introduction, Probability distribution functions, Binomial distributions, Poisson distribution

Lecture 2: Treatment of Gaussian Errors

The central limit theorem, Gaussian errors, Error propagation, Combination of measurements, Multi-dimensional Gaussian errors, Error Matrix

Lecture 3: Fitting and Hypothesis Testing

The χ^2 test, Likelihood functions, Fitting, Binned maximum likelihood, Unbinned maximum likelihood

Lecture 4: The Dark Arts

Bayesian Inference, Credible Intervals


The Frequentist approach, Confidence Intervals

Systematic Uncertainties

Parameter Estimation Revisited

- ★ Let's consider more carefully the maximum likelihood method
for simplicity consider a single parameter x
- ★ Construct the likelihood that our data are consistent with the model, i.e.
the probability that the model would give the observed data

$$L = P(\text{data}; x)$$



- ★ We have then (very reasonably) taken the value of x which maximises the likelihood as our best estimate of the parameter
- ★ With less justification we then took our error *estimate* from

$$-\ln L \rightarrow -\ln L + \frac{1}{2}$$

- ★ Does this really make sense ?
- ★ What we really want to calculate is the **posterior** PDF for the parameter given the data, i.e.

$$P(x; \text{data})$$

“assumed” $P(x; \text{data}) = P(\text{data}; x)$

Can not justify this – in general it is not the case

Conditional Probabilities and Bayes' Theory

★ A nice example of conditional probability (from L. Lyons)

- In the general population, the probability of a randomly selected woman being pregnant is 2%

$$P(\text{pregnant}; \text{woman}) = 0.02$$

- But

$$P(\text{woman}; \text{pregnant}) \gg 0.02$$

★ Correct treatment of conditional probabilities requires Bayes' theorem

- Probability of **A** and **B** can be expressed in terms of conditional probabilities

$$P(AB) = P(A;B)P(B) = P(B;A)P(A)$$

$$P(A;B) = \frac{P(B;A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

★ Here the **prior probability** of selecting a woman is

$$P(\text{woman}) = 0.50 \quad \text{i.e. half population are women}$$

and the **prior probability** of selecting a pregnant person is

$$P(\text{pregnant}) = 0.01 \quad \text{i.e. 1 \% of population are pregnant}$$

$$P(\text{woman}; \text{pregnant}) = \frac{P(\text{pregnant}; \text{woman})P(\text{woman})}{P(\text{pregnant})} = \frac{0.02 \times 0.5}{0.01} = 1$$

Sanity restored...

- ★ Apply Bayes' theory to our the measurement of a parameter x
 - We determine $P(\text{data};x)$, i.e. the likelihood function
 - We want $P(x;\text{data})$, i.e. the PDF for x in the light of the data
 - Bayes' theory gives:

$$P(x;\text{data}) = \frac{P(\text{data};x)P(x)}{P(\text{data})}$$

$P(\text{data};x)$ the likelihood function, i.e. **what we measure**

$P(x;\text{data})$ the **posterior** PDF for x , i.e. **in the light of the data**

$P(\text{data})$ { **prior** probability of the data. Since this doesn't depend on x it is essentially a normalisation constant

$P(x)$ { **prior probability** of x , i.e. encompassing our knowledge of x before the measurement

- ★ Bayes' theory tells us how to modify our knowledge of x in the light of new data

Bayes' theory is the formal basis of Statistical Inference

Applying Bayes' Theorem

- ★ Bayes' theory provides an unambiguous prescription for going from

$$P(\text{data}; x) \rightarrow P(x; \text{data})$$

- ★ But you need to provide the **PRIOR PROBABILITY** $P(x)$
- ★ This is fine if you have an objective prior, e.g. a previous measurement

$$P(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_1} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-x_1)^2}{2\sigma_1^2}\right\}$$

- If we now make a new measurement, i.e. determine the likelihood function

$$P(\text{data}; x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_2} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-x_2)^2}{2\sigma_2^2}\right\}$$

- Bayes' theory then gives

$$P(x; \text{data}) = \frac{P(\text{data}; x)P(x)}{P(\text{data})} = \frac{1}{P(\text{data})} \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma_1\sigma_2} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-x_1)^2}{2\sigma_1^2} - \frac{(x-x_2)^2}{2\sigma_2^2}\right\}$$

$$P(x; \text{data}) = \frac{1}{P(\text{data})} \frac{1}{2\pi\sigma_1\sigma_2} \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-\bar{x})^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\}$$

Where \bar{x} and σ are the usual mean and variance for combining two measurements

- For this to be a (normalised) PDF can infer (although it isn't of any interest):

$$P(\text{data}) = [2\pi(\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2)]^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$

The Problem with Applying Bayes' Theorem

- ★ The problem arises when there is no **objective prior**
- ★ For example, in a hypothetical **background free search** for a **Z'**, observe no events

- No problem in calculating the likelihood function (a conditional probability)

$$P(\text{data}; x) = P(0; x) = e^{-x} \quad \leftarrow \text{Poisson prob. for observing 0}$$

x is the true number of expected events

- What is the best estimate of x and the 90 % “confidence level upper limit” ?
- Depends on the choice of prior probability:

$$P(x; \text{data}) = P(x)e^{-x}$$

- What to do about the prior ?
- i.e. how do we express our knowledge (none) of x prior to the measurement
- ★ In general there is **no objective answer**, always putting in **some extra information**
 - i.e. a subjective bias
 - could argue that a **flat prior**, i.e. $P(x) = \text{constant}$, is objective
 - but why not choose a prior that is flat in $\ln x$?
 - for some limits/measurements (e.g. a mass) a flat prior in $\ln x$ is more natural
 - the arbitrariness in the choice of prior is a problem for the Bayesian approach
 - it can make a big difference...

Choice of Prior, example I



★ See no events...

$$P(\text{data}; x) = P(0; x) = e^{-x}$$

Poisson prob. for observing 0

Prior flat prior in x : $P(x) = \text{const.}$

Prior flat prior in $\ln x$: $P(\ln x) = \text{const.}$



★ The Conclusions are very different. Compare regions containing 90 % of probability

$$x < 2.3$$

$$x < 0.46$$

▪ In this case, the choice of prior is important


Choice of Prior, example II

- ★ Suppose we measure the W-boson mass: $80.1 \pm 4.1 \text{ GeV}$

$$P(\text{data}; m) = G(80.1; m) \propto \exp \left\{ -\frac{(80.1 - m)^2}{2 \times 4.1^2} \right\}$$

- ★ We want $P(m; \text{data}) = P(m)P(\text{data}; m)$

- Again consider two priors



- Here the choice of prior is **NOT** important
- The data are “strong enough” to overcome our prior assumptions (subjective bias)
- Here, can interpret the measurement as a **Gaussian PDF** for m

★ So what do we learn from this ?


- Whilst we know how to apply Bayesian statistical inference, we have insufficient data, i.e. we don't know the prior
- Unless the data are “strong”, i.e. override the information in the reasonable range of prior probabilities, we cannot expect to know

$$P(x; \text{data})$$

- Applies equally to our experiment where we saw zero events and wanted to arrive at a PDF for the expected mean number of events...
Don't have enough information to answer this question

Bayesian Credible Intervals

- ★ Ideally, (I) would like to work with probabilities, i.e. a PDF which encompasses all our knowledge of a particular parameter, e.g. $P(m_H; \text{data})$



- ★ Could then integrate PDF to contain 95 % of probability. Can then define the “95 % **Credible Interval**”: $m_H < 186$ GeV”
- ★ To do this need to go from $P(\text{data}; m_H)$, i.e. from $\Delta \ln \mathcal{L}$, to $P(m_H; \text{data})$
 - requires “subjective” choice of **prior probability**
- ★ Hence Bayesian Credible Intervals necessarily include some additional input beyond the data alone...

*This is not what is done.

Bayesian Credible Intervals - example

- ★ Trying to estimate a selection efficiency using MC events. All N events pass cuts.
 - what statement can we make about the efficiency?

- ★ Binomial distribution...

$$P(\text{data}; x) \rightarrow P(N; \varepsilon) = {}^N C_N \varepsilon^N (1 - \varepsilon)^0 = \varepsilon^N$$

- ★ Apply Bayes' theorem:

$$P(x; \text{data}) \rightarrow P(\varepsilon; N) = \frac{P(N; \varepsilon) P(\varepsilon)}{P(N)}$$

← Prior
← Constant

- ★ Choose prior, e.g. $P(\varepsilon) = 1$



$$P(\varepsilon; N) = \kappa \varepsilon^N$$

- ★ Normalise $\int_0^1 P(\varepsilon; N) d\varepsilon = 1 \Rightarrow \kappa = (N + 1)$

$$P(\varepsilon; N) = (N + 1) \varepsilon^N$$

★ Integrate $P(\epsilon; N) = (N + 1)\epsilon^N$ to find region containing 90% of probability

→ $\epsilon_{90\%} = (1 - 0.90)^{\frac{1}{N+1}}$





90 % Credible Interval: $\epsilon > 0.81$

$\epsilon > 0.977$

(with a flat prior probability)

Likelihood Ordering

- ★ Note, 90 % credible interval is not uniquely defined
 - more than one interval contains 90 % probability, e.g. $N = 100, r = 98$



90 % Credible Interval: $\epsilon > 0.9482$

$0.9456 < \epsilon < 0.9956$

- ★ Natural, to choose the interval such that all points in the excluded region are lower in likelihood than those in the credible interval : **likelihood ordering**
- ★ Credible intervals provide an intuitive way of interpreting data, but:
 - Rarely used in Particle Physics as a way of presenting data
 - Because they represent the “data” and “prior” combined
 - **NOTE: all information from the experiment is in the likelihood $P(\text{data};x)$**

C.I. vs C. L.

- ★ From data obtain $P(\text{data}; x)$
- ★ Bayes' theorem provides **the** mathematical framework for statistical inference
- ★ To go from $P(\text{data}; x) \rightarrow P(x; \text{data})$ requires a (usually) subjective choice of **Prior probability**
- ★ For “weak” data, the choice of Prior can drive the interpretation of the data
- ★ Credible intervals are a useful way of interpreting data, but are generally not used in Particle Physics as a way of presenting the conclusions of an experiment.
- ★ Particle Physics to use Frequentist “Confidence limits” which are not $P(x; \text{data})$ [and do not form a mathematically consistent basis for statistical inference]
- ★ Finally, never forget that credible intervals (or confidence limits) are an interpretation of the data


The experimental result is the likelihood function $P(\text{data}; x)$

A Few words on Systematics Uncertainties

- ★ **Systematic Uncertainties** are often associated with an internal unknown bias, e.g.
 - How well do you know your calibration
 - How well does MC model the data, e.g. jet fragmentation parameters
- ★ **Parametric Uncertainties** associated with uncertain parameters
 - How does the uncertainty on the Higgs mass impact the interpretation of a measurement
- ★ **No over-riding principle – just some general guidelines**
 - Once a result is published, systematic errors will be treated as if they are Gaussian
$$x = a \pm b \text{ (stat.)} \pm c \text{ (syst.)}$$
 - Some systematic errors are **Gaussian**: e.g. energy scale determined from data e.g. $Z \rightarrow e^+e^-$ to determine electron energy scale
 - Others are not: e.g. impact of different jet hadronisation models, where one might compare **PYTHIA** with **HERWIG** – here one obtains a single estimate of the scale of the uncertainties
 - Theoretical uncertainties: e.g. missing HO corrections. Again these are estimates – should not be treated as Gaussian (although they are)
- ★ **Systematic dominated measurements**
 - Beware – if there is a single dominating systematic error and it is inherently non-Gaussian, this is a problem

Estimating Systematics Uncertainties

★ No rules – just guidelines

- Remember syst. errors will be treated as Gaussian, so try to evaluate them on this basis, e.g. suppose use 3 alternative MC jet fragmentation models and result changes by $+\Delta_1$, $+\Delta_2$ and $-\Delta_3$ (where Δ_2 is the largest):
 - i) take largest shift as systematic error estimate: Δ_2 ?
 - ii) assume error distributed uniformly in “box” of width $2\Delta_2$ giving an rms of $2\Delta_2/\sqrt{12}$?
- **Cut variation is evil** (i.e. vary cuts and see how results change)
 - at best, introduces statistical noise
 - at worst, hides away lack of understanding of some data - MC discrepancy
  understand the origin of the discrepancy
- Wherever possible use data driven estimates, energy scales, control samples, etc.
- Remember that you are **estimating** the scale of a possible systematic bias

Incorporating Systematics into Fits

★ Two commonly used approaches

- Error matrix – with (correlated) systematic uncertainties
- Nuisance parameters

★ Nuisance parameter example:

- Suppose we are looking at WW decays and count numbers of events in three different decay channels qqqq, qqlv and lvlv
- Want to measure cross section and hadronic branching fractions accounting for common luminosity uncertainty

i) build physics model

$$N_{qqqq}^{\text{exp}}(\sigma_{\text{WW}}, B_{qq}, \mathcal{L}) = \frac{\sigma_{\text{WW}}}{\varepsilon \mathcal{L}} B_{qq}^2$$

ii) build likelihood function

$$\chi^2(\sigma_{\text{WW}}, B_{qq}, \mathcal{L}) = -2 \ln L = \frac{(N_{qqqq}^{\text{exp}} - N_{qqqq}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{qqqq}^{\text{exp}}} + \frac{(N_{qqlv}^{\text{exp}} - N_{qqlv}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{qqlv}^{\text{exp}}} + \frac{(N_{lvlv}^{\text{exp}} - N_{lvlv}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{lvlv}^{\text{exp}}}$$

iii) add penalty term for nuisance parameters, here integrated lumi. Known to be \mathcal{L}_0 with uncertainty $\sigma_{\mathcal{L}}$

$$\chi^2(\sigma_{\text{WW}}, B_{qq}, \mathcal{L}) = -2 \ln L = \frac{(N_{qqqq}^{\text{exp}} - N_{qqqq}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{qqqq}^{\text{exp}}} + \frac{(N_{qqlv}^{\text{exp}} - N_{qqlv}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{qqlv}^{\text{exp}}} + \frac{(N_{lvlv}^{\text{exp}} - N_{lvlv}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{lvlv}^{\text{exp}}} + \frac{(\mathcal{L} - \mathcal{L}_0)^2}{\sigma_{\mathcal{L}}^2}$$

Incorporating Systematics into Fits

★ Let's consider this more closely

$$\chi^2(\sigma_{\text{WW}}, B_{\text{qq}}, \mathcal{L}) = -2 \ln L = \frac{(N_{\text{qqqq}}^{\text{exp}} - N_{\text{qqqq}}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{\text{qqqq}}^{\text{exp}}} + \dots \frac{(N_{\text{qqlv}}^{\text{exp}} - N_{\text{qqlv}}^{\text{obs}})^2}{N_{\text{qqlv}}^{\text{exp}}} + \frac{(\mathcal{L} - \mathcal{L}_0)^2}{\sigma_{\mathcal{L}}^2}$$

- **We are now fitting 3 parameters**
 - the number of degrees of freedom has not changed, since we have added one parameter, but also one additional “data point”
- **Of the 3 parameters, we are “not interested” in the fitted value of the lumi.**
- **The penalty term constrains the luminosity to be consistent with the externally measured value**
- **The presence of the nuisance parameters will flatten the fitted likelihood surface – increasing the uncertainties on the fitted parameters**
- **Also have some measure of the tension in the fit**
 - if the data pull the nuisance parameter away from the expected value, could indicate a problem

Appendix: Choice of Prior, example III

- ♦ An example (apparently due to Newton), e.g. see CERN Yellow Report 2000-005

- ★ Suppose you are in the Tower of London facing execution.

- ★ The Queen arrives carrying a small bag and says

“This bag contains 5 balls; the balls are either white or black. If you correctly guess the number of black balls, I will spare your life and set you free.”

- ★ The Queen is in a good mood and continues

“To give you a better chance, you can take one of the balls from the bag.”

It's BLACK

- ★ The Queen points her pistol at you

“Time to choose, sucker...”

- ★ What do you guess to maximise your chance of survival ?


- ★ Use statistical inference to analyse the problem.

- Let n be the number of black balls in the bag.

- The data are “that you picked out a black ball”



- Can calculate $P(\text{data}; n)$

e.g. if there were two black balls chance of picking out a black ball from the five in the bag was $2/5$.





- ★ But we want $P(n; \text{data}) \propto P(n)P(\text{data}; n)$
- ★ Answer depends on choice of Prior

★ Could assume flat Prior



GUESS: 5

★ Could assume balls drawn randomly from a large bag containing equal nos. B & W



GUESS: 3

★ Oh dear... answer depends on Prior (unknown) assumptions